Beyond
the Horizon of Exclusivism:
By
Sean William Anthony
bd
Within the twentieth century, we as a human raced have experienced vast changes of unequaled proportions in our societies, cultures, governments, and religions. Humans have utilized the capability to communicate with each other instantaneously around and the world and are able to span the globe in an increasingly shorter amount of time. This has caused a simultaneous crisis of worldviews colliding—leaving traditional lenses through which people view the world shattered. With an awareness of cultures foreign to our own comes an awareness of other ideas that are quite contrary to one another or even defy one another. Christianity has not remained immune to these events. Increasingly, theologians are calling Christians to look once again at how we relate to the religions of world, and indeed, how they relate to us. Wilfred Cantwell Smith purports that this encounter of Christianity with the other world religions shall prove to be as fateful as its encounter with Greek philosophy and modern science.[1]
For nearly two thousand years, Christians have understood the work and life of Jesus Christ to be the only means to attain salvation. New knowledge has threatened this belief repeatedly, and now we are left wondering if Jesus Christ is indeed the Way and the Truth. Can we still confess, “There is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among mortals by which we must be saved” (Acts 4.12, NRSV)? More importantly, if we can no longer make this confession are we, therefore, no longer to be Christian? This paper looks beyond the horizons of exclusivism and the limitations inherent therein. The world religions are a challenge Christians must face and encounter afresh with boldness and serenity. Old molds in which we have categorized ourselves in the world are no longer tenable.
We cannot be content just to arbitrarily aver that Christianity is true and all other religions are false. The most influential exclusivist of this century, Karl Barth, writes beautifully about the Gospel,
The Gospel is not a truth among
other truths. Rather, it sets a
question mark against all truths. The
Gospel is not the door but the hinge … The Gospel is the victory by which the
world is overcome. By the Gospel, the
whole concrete world is dissolved and established.[2]
However, in our love and passion for the truth that God has given to us, we stand susceptible to the failure of Barth’s dialectical theology, which condemning all religion (even Christian religion!) as unbelief and natural theology, failed to seriously engage any religious system outside Christianity. For that reason, Barth’s theology will be, unfortunately, useable only in a foundational or parochial sense in any pursuit of a theology of religions.
The Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner developed one of the first well-articulated inclusivist theologies of the twentieth century. Interestingly enough, his views took place within the Catholic Church, which has a long history of denying salvation beyond the Catholic Church (Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus est as it declared in 1442 Council of Florence). His views freed the Roman Church from this doctrine without ever breaking continuity with the past by shaping largely the views professed by Vatican II.[3]
Rahner’s view of ‘anonymous’ Christians defined his own approach to non-Christian religions and the historical problem of Christianity claiming absolutism while being restricted to specific parts of the geographic dissemination of humankind. In an essay entitled “Christianity and the non-Christian Religions,”[4] Rahner delineates four theses upon which to view non-Christian religions.
The first thesis strikes one as rather familiar and congruent with traditional Christian belief, “Christianity understands itself as the absolute religion intended for all men, which cannot recognize any other religion beside itself as of equal right.”[5] Furthermore, he emphasizes the importance of this statement saying, “this proposition is self-evident and basic for Christianity’s understanding itself.”[6] Christianity’s absoluteness, according to Rahner, is totally based upon the Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection of Jesus Christ; thereby, Jesus Christ united the world with God in actual reality and not mere theory. The reality of the revelatory and reconciliatory event as stewarded by the religion of the church, thus, “binds man to God.”[7] A problem arising comes in the how we understand the place of non-Christian religions in the historical economy of Divine redemption.[8] Now comes the second crux of Rahner’s first thesis, i.e. the historical limitations of the revelation of God in Jesus. Rahner explains:
As a historical quantity
Christianity has … a temporal spatial starting point in Jesus of Nazareth and
in the saving event of the unique Cross and empty tomb in Jerusalem. It follows from this, however, that this absolute
religion — even when it begins to be this for practically all men —must come in
a historical way to men… It is
therefore a question of whether this moment, when the existentially real demand
is made by the absolute religion in its historical form takes place … is at the
same chronological moment for all men, or whether this occurrence … has itself
a history and thus is not … simultaneous for all men, cultures and spaces of
history.[9]
Some may criticize this view as being not only geocentric but also ethnocentric. In other words, it is easy to say such a statement when your own culture has received this absolute revelation. However, note how Rahner distinguishes that every individual must meet the revelation within his own personal history. Furthermore, Christianity could never be designated specifically as occidental, Western, European, or American. It is, indeed, a world religion with manifold cultural expressions from Armenian to Ethiopian to Korean to Latino to Coptic!
Rahner’s second thesis then attempts to assert something affirmative. This he does by turning his attention to the adherents and faith of other religions:
Until the moment the gospel
really enters into the historical situation of an individual, a non-Christian
religion … does not merely contain elements of natural knowledge of God … mixed
up with human depravity … [but also] contains supernatural elements… For this reason a non-Christian religion can
be recognized as a lawful [i.e. legitimate] religion (although in
different degrees) without thereby denying the error and depravity contained in
it.[10]
In formulating this thesis, Rahner recognizes that he is treading upon a precarious precipice; thus, he writes carefully and precisely. Though he describes non-Christian religions as ‘lawful,’ he only does so believing that every non-Christian religion becomes unlawful, “right from the moment when they come into a real and historically powerful contact with Christianity.”[11] Rahner seeks to liberate Christian understanding of other religions from an ‘either/or,’ i.e. the belief that other religions are either human constructs or from God. If God offers salvation in this life and loves human beings desiring to save them, then it is not a strange proposition to suggest that everyone experiences God’s grace. “Hence we have every right to suppose that grace has not only been offered outside the Christian Church, but also … that grace gains the victory.”[12]
His third thesis follows, “If the second thesis is correct, then Christianity does not simply confront the member of an extra-Christian religion as a mere non-Christian but as someone who can and must already be regarded as an anonymous Christian [emphasis mine].”[13] The term ‘anonymous Christian’ has since gained a great deal of attention. Some critics would consider it insulting. These criticisms will be addressed when I deal with the theology of Hans Küng. In this third thesis, Rahner essentially portrays those believers of non-Christian religions as possessing common ground with Christians and in touch with the salvation of Jesus Christ. Many who have experienced meeting a member of a faith other than their own speak of how shocked they were to discover how much they shared in common. Rahner himself states it thus, “a person who becomes the object of the Church’s missionary efforts … may be already someone on the way to salvation, and someone who in certain circumstances finds it … it is at the same time true that this salvation … is Christ’s salvation, since there is no other salvation.”[14]
What then is the task of the Church? Rahner elucidates the answer to this question in his fourth and final thesis. Rahner sees the task of the Church to seek out these anonymous forms of Christianity and bring to “explicit consciousness” that which already belongs to it as “a divine gift of grace accepted unreflectedly and implicitly.”[15] Thus, he hopes that being these statements are true that, “the Church will not so much regard herself today as the exclusive community of those who have a claim to salvation but rather as the historically tangible vanguard and the historically and socially constituted expression of what the Christian hopes is present … even outside the visible Church.”[16]
Hans Küng - Christianity as Critical Catalyst
Hans Küng has proven to be a leading theologian in the field of understanding Christianity’s relationship to the world religions. This reputation has been established relatively recently with publication of many articles and books published by him.[17] On Being a Christian represents Küngs apologetic and uniquely exhorting view of the Christian faith. In it, he addresses many concerns, for the scope of the work is large. Nonetheless, Küng takes a decent amount of space to examine how Christians should view members of other religions and the faith of the adherents.[18] His methodology is given strong support through his argumentation and is present, working itself out, in his later and more recent works.
Küng first addresses the reality of salvation outside the Church. Like Rahner, Küng has strong relations to the Catholic Church, though Küng may not always be in the Roman Church’s good graces. Küng is highly critical of the past views of religions outside Christianity and embraces the changes that have occurred in current thinking:
The other religions were
regarded formerly as lies, works of the devil and—at best—vestigial truth. Now they count as a kind of (“relative”)
revelation through which innumerable individuals … have experienced and now
experience the mystery of God.
Formerly, they seemed to be ways of damnation. Now they are recognized as ways of salvation … for innumerable
persons, perhaps indeed for the majority of mankind.[19]
Thinkers have revalued the religions in a fresh, new light. Realizing that some objections do exist, Küng appeals to the wealth of the religions. In these days of cultural clashes and globalization, striking similarities (and discrepancies!) appear to those who are seeking understanding—many of which deeply undermining views of exclusivity and absolutism. Küng gives three statements:
·
Not only Christianity,
but also the world religions are aware of man’s alienation, enslavement, need of redemption …
·
Not only Christianity,
but also the world religions perceive the
goodness, mercy and graciousness of the Divinity… [which] despite its
closeness, is distant and hidden.
·
Not only Christianity,
but also the world religions rightly heed the call of their prophets … as they receive from their
great prophetical figures—models of knowledge and behavior—inspiration … for a
new start toward greater truth … toward revival and renewal…[20]
Here Küng tends to over generalize the beliefs of many world religions, but his purpose is nonetheless accomplished, i.e. to, like Rahner, show that the world religions have not only ‘natural’ but also ‘supernatural’ revelation.
Küng next sets his aim to examine some of the “bewildering consequences” of this realization of the extra-Christian religions’ wealth of salvific content.[21] With this aim, he takes opportunity to criticize Rahner’s approach along with his supporters who claim to reinterpret the Council of Florence in Vatican II and doubts if the idea of an anonymous Christian or Christianity really solves the problem. For Küng, it fails to do justice to the reality of the situation,
Are the masses of the
non-Christian religions really marching into the holy Roman Church? Or is this going on only in the theologian’s
head? Anyway, in reality, they—Jews,
Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists … who know quite well that they are completely
“unanonymous”—remain outside. Nor have
they any wish to be inside.[22]
Perhaps his most sharp criticism comes when he accuses the approach of making Christianity merely a “religious luxury” and seeing the Christian ethos as simply “superfluous.”[23] Sparing not even Protestant theologians, Küng denies that the Barthian/Neo-Orthodox view of all religions as nothing other than natural theology and Christianity not existing as a religion since the Gospel is the end of all religion, which are ultimately human and, therefore, subject to God’s judgment.[24] Küng ultimately wants to present his ideas as more risqué than the fickle views of Rahner but also less arrogantly assertive than dialectical theology.
In his third section, world religions are examined in light of Christianity as existing as entities which test each other. Not only Christianity is challenged, but also Christianity challenges the world religions. Küng is, therefore, in favor neither of trying to reconcile Christian beliefs with the world religions nor of abstaining from criticizing aspects of other religions:
If Christian theology today
asserts that all men—even in the world religions—can be saved, this certainly
does not mean that all religions are equally true. They will be saved, but not because of, but in spite of
polytheism, magic, human sacrifice, forces of nature. They will be saved, not because of, but in spite of all untruth
and superstition.[25]
From this statement, he takes opportunity to give examples by criticizing a prominent feature of each major religion. Islam views its revelation too unhistorically; Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism have a cyclical worldview; Hinduism has the religious caste system that is linked to its belief in rebirth; Buddhism views this world as too unreal; and Confucianism [as well as Neo-Confucianism] is weak in its unparalleled traditionalism: ancestor worship, overvaluation of age, endorsement of patriarchal structures, etc.[26]
Küng also then demonstrates that Christianity is equally subject to criticism by the religions of the world and introduces his idea of Christian existence as critical catalyst among the world religions.[27] Our goals, according to Küng, are neither “the arrogant domination of a religion” nor a “syncretist mingling of all religions,” but “what we must strive for is an independent, unselfish Christian ministry to human beings in the religions.”[28] In the end, the focus is not Christian exclusiveness for Küng; rather, it is Christian uniqueness for Christ is unique.[29] In approaching the world religions, he emphasizes that our concern, as Christians, should never be concepts, ideas, and system, but our interactions should be with the humans that adhere to these manifold faiths and the living experiences they hold so dear—meaning two things consequentially. One, the study of faiths must not represent faiths in archaic or ‘classical’ forms but must recognize that these are living faiths. Secondly, that there must be sought a truly Chinese, Japanese, Indonesian, Arab, African, Indian Christianity freed from the chains of occidental traditions.[30]
John Hick’s Pluralist Theology of Religions
Upon writing this paper, I felt slight trepidation concerning spending time examining any theology that would consider itself ‘pluralist,’ though the aim of this paper is to seek to grasp for a theology of religions beyond the stronghold of the anemic exclusivisms that has held Christianity captive —disallowing any real understanding or dialogue between its adherents and those adherents of other faiths. Pluralism appears to sink into the oblivion that consumes what defines Christianity as Christianity—the woeful end being a faith and approach that can be considered Christian only in the nomenclature of a very sloppy student of religious studies. One author even writes, “pluralism must always logically fit be a form of exclusivism and … nothing called pluralism really exists.”[31] Even pluralism possesses its own truth claims. Nevertheless, there are and continue to be those theologians who insist on calling themselves Christians but espouse a pluralist theology. John Hick is the foremost speaker for this group and definitely the most prolific writer. Responding to the above statement, Hick writes, “To say that … religious pluralism is a version of … religious exclusivism, would be so totally implausible that cannot be what D’Costa means. Even if we banished the word ‘pluralism’ the two rival views would remain so manifestly different that we would still need different names for them.”[32] I would have to agree with this, and I hope my examination of John Hick’s theology will show why. Giving Hick special attention, I want to examine his theology of religions, but I also want to examine pluralism as an idea itself —giving it a litmus test of sorts to determine if it is palatable for one who adheres to a ‘Christian’ worldview.
John Hick calls for a Copernican Revolution of theology in relating to world religions outside of Christianity. The theological revolution is labeled Copernican inasmuch as the prevailing views, be it exclusivism or inclusivism, are characterized as Ptolemaic. As Ptolemaic cosmology saw the Earth as the center of the universe, ‘Ptolemaic’ theology sees Christianity and Christ as the center of the theological/soteriological universe. Whereas Rahner portrayed Christianity as merely geocentric, Hick specifically designates it as ethnocentric. Hick’s pluralism (along with his compatriots; e.g. Paul Knitter, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, etc.) goes beyond inclusivism in that it acknowledges the actual salvific aspect of non-Christian religions to be innate to that religion itself—not borrowed from Christianity or even related to Jesus Christ whatsoever. According to Hick, inclusivism does not go far enough, for it is merely a tweaking of an overly narrow-minded exclusivist view. In reality, as will be shown later, the real problem of Hick with inclusivism is the problem of Christology.[33]
For Hick, all religions lack indubitable truth that can claim absolute veracity. Hick’s views are a response to the disappointment that Christianity, nor any other religion, can adequately be shown to be superior to all others. This has led many skeptics to reject religion altogether. Peter Byrne summarizes Hick’s response,
None[ of the world religions,
the skeptic] reasons, can solely or uniquely contain the saving truth man needs
and this is because all are unreliable or false. Hick … accepts the first part of this contention but denies the
second. He believes that none of the
world’s great faiths are uniquely or exclusively true because all are true [emphasis
mine].[34]
Hick’s criteria for truth then becomes that, “… every conception of the divine which has come out of a great revelatory religious experience and has been tested through a long tradition of worship and has sustained human faith over centuries of time and in millions of lives, is likely to represent a genuine encounter with the divine reality.”[35] In God and the Universe of Faiths, Hick gives a well-known parable:
An elephant was brought to a
group of blind men who had never seen such an animal before. One felt a leg and reported that an elephant
is a great living pillar. Another felt
the trunk and reported than an elephant is a great snake. Another felt a tusk and reported that an
elephant is like a sharp ploughshare.
And so on. And then they
quarreled together, each claiming that his own account was the truth and
therefore all the others false. In fact
of course they were all true but only each referring to one aspect of the total
reality and all expressed in very imperfect analogies.[36]
The problem with this parable, however, is that every blind man was sorely mistaken in his interpretation and confused as to the reality before them; therefore, listening to any of the blind men will lead one away from what a an actual elephant is and not toward a realization of actual reality.
In his article examining John Hick’s theological Pluralism, Peter Byrne observes three ways in which Hick is able to sidestep unbelief and instead prefer theological pluralism. First, John Hick asserts that all religions contain revelation, though culturally conditioned. To relate to the parable, the fact that they even felt and elephant would be revelation; however, the words and interpretation/analogies applied to describing this event would be the cultural conditioning. Hick writes,
Our beliefs are … conclusions
arising from a vast array of influences and considerations—the family and
culture and epoch into which we were born, our education and our life
experiences, our reading and interaction with others, etc. Much more goes into it than clearly
articulated arguments … Is it because of carefully weighed arguments that I am
a Christian rather than a Muslim or Buddhist?
Does it not have a great deal to do with the fact that I was born in
England rather than, say in Saudi Arabia or Thailand? [R]eligion creates us in our own image, so that naturally it fits
us and we fit it as no other can.[37]
Secondly, John Hick subjugates the importance of doctrines and creeds to religious experience. Experience becomes more important to defining religion than dogmatic creeds that solidify belief within certain parameters. It is here, and not in doctrine, that we find, “again and again the overlap and confluence of faiths.”[38] Finally, with this emphasis on experience, Hick “reinterprets the concept of truth in religion … in such a way as would remove the worry about whether the religions give us reliable information about the divine… [Hick’s assertions] imply that the truth of what is said about the object of religion does not matter so long as the responses to that object are of a certain character.”[39] The end of Hicks reasoning leaves one in the realm of ‘tolerant agnosticism’ that takes as the only common, secure ground upon which to stand as the similarity of religious experience.
The ultimate move of Hick’s theological pluralism concerns Christianity specifically. A problem within Christian theology, according to Hick, is that it is Christocentric rather than theocentric (or even a ‘Reality-centric’ view’). In fact, the doctrine of God incarnating Himself once and for every human’s salvation in the singular, real, and historical Jesus of Nazareth undermines Hick’s pluralism altogether. For this reason he rejects the doctrine as a ‘myth.’ Wolfhart Pannenberg states, “If Jesus is to be understood as the incarnate son of God, then the claim to Christian uniqueness is inevitable. Therefore, Hick’s proposal of religious pluralism as an option of authentically Christian theology hinges on the condition of a prior demolition of the tradition doctrine of the incarnation.”[40] Hick writes his ideal development of Christianity as,
… a form of Christianity which
reveres Jesus as its supreme teacher and inspirer but does not regard him as
literally God incarnate; which seeks to nurture men and women from
self-centredness to a new centering in God, thus promoting not only individual
but also social and national and international unselfishness; and that sees
itself as one major spiritual path among others …[41]
It is here, however, that Hick is most criticized by many Christian because many of us doubt that we can retain our identity and abandon our belief in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. Noting that the real Copernican revolution was based on objective fact, Leslie Newbigin writes, “The Hickian revolution is exactly the opposite of the Copernican. It is a move from the view centered on the objective reality of the man Jesus Christ, to a view centered on my subjective conception of ultimate reality.”[42]
Conclusion- Approaching World Religions
From these three unique perspectives, I hope to critically construct a launch pad for a balanced and realistic construction of an inclusivist approach to the world religions. The danger of any theology of religions is to never become truly a theology that actually interacts with the living religion itself. Pluralism has a nasty habit of diluting the beliefs of religions for the sake of conciliatory efforts. Inclusivism too often has the tendency to be overly patronizing and assuming in regards to adherents of other faiths. Rahner’s position appears naïve and overly dependent on what is in reality a lot of dreaming. Küng’s thoughts arrive at an unjustifiable, pessimistic conclusion concerning Christian mission to the world religions. People have and continue to convert to Christianity even after being quite fervent adherents of their own faith (and vice versa, of course). We are not necessarily in a cultural cage—deadlocked into a predetermined religion. Hick’s pluralist theology sacrifices too much of Christian belief for the majority of Christendom and is “very close to unbelief.”[43] The criticisms are numerous, but instead of making an exhaustive critique, I would prefer to suggest an approach that one should find helpful when encountering world religions. An approach such as this will produce the fruits of discernment and reform within one’s own faith.
When encountering competitive truth claims, we should take seriously that claim imposed upon us and the peoples which that truth claim encounters. Talking to friends of mine who know someone who is Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, etc., I often ask them, “Have you ever considered that faith to be a serious option for yourself?” In their evangelistic zeal, rarely do I hear a, “Yes.” Misrepresentations like, “They’re worship is not really sincere,” “We do not worship the same God,” or “The devil has deceived those people,” are completely unsound once a true encounter with a living faith occurs. One is always shocked at the sincerity and powerful changes experienced by members of other faiths. People actually have good reasons not to be Christian, and we ourselves, as seekers of truth, must be open to the possibility that Christian is not true. “Why do we believe in Christianity and not such and such religion?” —this question, no matter how arduous the path to finding it may be, must be answered with integrity. Answers as those given by John Hick and company (e.g. “because of my culture!”) are really no answers at all. A religion must be understood on its own terms, and then one may either reject or accept the claims that it makes. We must first approach all religious truth claims as humans and not as Christians, Muslims, Hindus, etc.
When examining other religions as disciples of Jesus, we must first examine what distinguishes Christianity from the other religion and vice versa. Only when one sees why Christianity and the beliefs of other religions are irreconcilable will one have a strong safeguard, though of course never infallible or perfect, against looking for the ‘good parts’ in all the world religions. A precarious exercise is to look for similarities before differences, because there is a tendency to create artificial areas of common ground and to ‘Christianize’ the foreign faith. Though it is tempting to create artificial differences as well, those errors are more easily ameliorated. In other words, religions should be seen as self-defining entities that need no outside help to be understood. Examples will be given of this in the appendix when I expound upon a Christian approach to Islam.
As Christians who believe that the love and grace of God is given freely to all humankind despite our sinfulness, we should examine other faiths to find evidence of His self-revelation to humankind through the Logos—to the glory and praise of God Almighty. God has and will continue to reveal Himself to humankind. He does this not because of favored positions we attain but despite humanity’s sinfulness. When we observe the universal work of the Spirit in all peoples and places, then we like Peter can say, “I truly understand that God shows no partiality” (Acts 10.34, NRSV). To bring things full circle, what then shall we say about Acts 4.12? Christians all over the world can proclaim this truth and still acknowledge the work of God in every contour of planet Earth. Acts 4.12 does not mean that, unless one has heard of Jesus, there is no chance that they may partake of the kingdom of God. Its message is, nonetheless, powerful and heavy to those who listen to its message. For it declares that salvation is now present on Earth like it never has been before through the Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the personal encounter with this message impinges upon one’s own chance of sharing in its power. An eternal destiny is, indeed, at stake. Nevertheless, the lack of such an encounter does not mean that God has withheld salvation from any people or individual. There are seeds of salvific revelation scattered throughout the entire world planted within the hearts of men who are beyond the periphery of Christianity.
APPENDIX:
A Christian Encounter with
Islam
Skipping precursory efforts to summarize or extract what could be understood as the basic tenants of Islamic belief and practice (e.g. tawhid, fiqh,the 5 pillars, etc.), I choose to examine Islam with that knowledge assumed to be acquired by the reader. The nature of this essay simply does not allow such an in-depth review to merely provide an informative foundation. Drawing from my knowledge of both religions, I have chosen a series of concerns that I believe both Christians and Muslims would agree are crucial issues that Islam forces us to confront. Islam and Muslims demand a response to the faith, and rightly so. As Kenneth Cragg writes, Christians must recognize that “Muslims continue to look for a response and to press the duty of it upon the Christian conscience and spirit. For all its tense implications they assume it to be a right and necessary obligation, theirs to require and our to meet.”[44] Unusual about the relationship of Christianity and Islam is that Islam, unlike any other non-Christian religion, exists as a polemic against Christianity. The most alarming encounters with the Qur’an, Muhammad’s life, and Islam as a living religion will be four basic, yet decisive, questions:
·
What is humankind, and
how do they relate to God?
·
Who, indeed, was
Muhammad—a demoniac, fool, mystic, the Seal of the Prophets? What was the true nature of his experience
and prophetic career and how does it relate to Christianity?
·
If the Qur’an avers that
Jesus is the Messiah, what does this mean?
Within Islamic though, who was Jesus and what happened in his life? Can this be reconciled to Christian beliefs
and historical fact?
·
How indeed does God
reveal Himself to humankind and how does this revelation manifest itself among
people of this world?
These four issues are the wedges that create the chasm between the Islamic faith and Christian faith. All objections and disputes dissolve into essence of these questions. For now, they will have to remain questions unfortunately. This essay attempts merely to chart a map for to beginning a journey.
What is humankind? The vastness of this topic forces me to just give a cursory review. Within the answer to this question, it is helpful to scrutinize the fall accounts within both the Quranic and Biblical traditions.[45] Though filled with fallacious and unjustified criticisms of the Biblical account, I will utilize Muhammad Iqbal’s comparative inspection of the two accounts as a model. Iqbal criticizes the Biblical view as pessimistic and overly historical; whereas missing mythical elements found in Genesis, the Quranic version, according to Iqbal, relates the story as non-historical and optimistic towards Adam as a vice-regent of God (Sura 2:30).[46] In response to Iqbal’s criticisms of the biblical account, the literary form of Genesis obviously separates it from the genre of historical accounts, but within the narrative, an important precept emerges. Humankind, as male and female interrelating, are created in the image of God (Genesis 1.27). To be a substitute ruler is one thing; however, to be intimately connected to God as created in his very image is quite another.
Iqbal relates the two accounts as the result of falling due to disobedience inspired by Satan; however, it is his third point that is the next of worthy note. The Old Testament curses the earth after man’s fall (Genesis 3.17-19), but the Qur’an merely introduces it as a dwelling place (Sura 7:24). The Quranic account places humankind in heaven before the Fall, not on Earth as in the Bible. He writes,
We see that the Quranic legend
of the Fall has nothing to do with the first appearance of man on this
planet. Its purpose is rather to
indicate man’s rise from a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the
conscious possession of a free self, capable of doubt and disobedience. The Fall does not mean any moral
depravity; it is man’s transition from simple consciousness to the first
flash of self-consciousness, a kind of waking from the dream of nature with a
throb of personal causality in one’s own being [emphasis mine].[47]
The statement concerning the Fall is very important for here we see the clearest bifurcation of Christian and Muslims belief—even clearer than the belief that humankind is vice-regent versus created in the image of God. Christian thought views man as totally depraved from birth. Theologians named this doctrine Original Sin. Reinhold Niebuhr explains the paradox of original sin well, “Original sin, which is by definition an inherited corruption, or at least an inevitable one, is nevertheless not to be regarded as being belonging to his essential nature and therefore is not outside the realm of human responsibility. Sin is natural for man in the sense that it is universal but not in the sense that it is necessary.”[48] To the contrary, Iqbal sees this situation, as described by the Qur’an, as necessary in man’s pubescent attempts to evolve and, therefore, as necessary. The Christian deduction of the existence of original sin, based on such scriptures as Psalm 51.5 and Romans 5.12ff as well as the history of Israel itself, leads to the realization that God, specifically in Jesus Christ, is humankind’s Redeemer. Such a conclusion is absent in Islam, wherein (guided by God) one becomes one’s own redeemer. Muhammad Iqbal asserts that the Qur’an, “believes in the possibility of improvement in the behavior of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism, which … is animated by the hope of man’s eventual victory over evil [emphasis mine].”[49] Iqbal’s statements here are not merely about becoming ‘a better person,’ but these statements must be understood as an improvement in man’s behavior via his further evolution. How distinct this is from Paul’s statement, “we are more than conquerors through him who loved us” (Romans 8.37)! Victory of evil, in Christian thought, is designated to the eschaton of the Age to Come consuming the Present Age through the apocalyptic coming of God.
Who was Muhammad? I ask this question not as a historian, but rather as a Christian. It is essentially a faith question and not a question asked intending to find scientific conclusions—though, hopefully, it will be examined rationally. Muhammad certainly lived through some event powerful enough to call him from his disillusioned, estranged state to a powerfully fervent prophetic career. A career he maintained despite vehement and cruel opposition in Mecca. I approach this experience along with Muhammad, as a human who has a supernatural encounter. According to the earliest biographies, this event occurred one fateful night on Mt. Hira on the outskirts of Mecca. Muhammad frequented this location in his love of solitude and meditation.
How are we to explain this powerful encounter? Scholars with more modern inclinations tend to explain the event in terms of psychological and natural influence. Ali Dashti writes,
A strong wish can make its object appear real and concrete. Formed in nearly thirty years of meditation, strengthened by contacts with followers of the scriptural religions [Judaism and Christianity], and super-charged by ascetic retreats to Mount Hera, Mohammad’s wish acquired the shape of a vision or, in mystic terminology, an illumination. In personified form, a call for action ran out from the depths of his subconscious mind. Fear of taking action weighed down so heavily upon him as to cause prostration and fainting. No other explanation of the angel’s pressing him until he became powerless is conceivable. The angel personified the aspiration long latent in the depths of his inner being. [50]
Many traditional Christians are quick to point out that the angel he encountered could have been a demon; however, they rarely support this assertion with any justification other than a general suspicion of Muhammad.[51] What also are we to say, then, of Muhammad’s repeated ecstatic experiences of revelation? Again, a natural explanation is available for those of us interested in speculation. Muhammad may have been epileptic. His descriptions sound strikingly similar to epilepsy. Fyodor Dostoevsky writes lucidly about his epilepsy through the characters of his novels, and there is a fascinating parallel in the descriptions of Dostoevsky and Muhammad. As people of faith, do we not also concede that what appears to be a merely natural phenomenon quite often has a miraculous dimension?
Muhammad claimed to be a prophet of universal importance (Sura 34:28). Indeed, the Qur’an designates Muhammad as the Seal of the Prophets bearing the final revelation of God. Hans Küng lists some uncanny parallels that exist between Muhammad and the prophets of the Hebrew Bible—many parallels that exist in no other religious leaders outside the Jewish tradition:
·
Like the prophets of
Israel, Muhammad based his work not on any office given him by the
community … but on a special, personal relationship with God.
·
Like the prophets of
Israel, Muhammad spoke out amid a religious and social crisis.
·
Like the prophets of
Israel, Muhammad, who usually call himself a “warner,” wished to be nothing but
God’s mouthpiece and to proclaim God’s word, not his own.
·
Like the prophets of
Israel, Muhammad tirelessly glorified the one God, who tolerates no other gods
before him and who, at the same time, is the kindly Creator and merciful Judge.
·
Like the prophets of
Israel, Muhammad insisted upon unconditional obedience, devotion and submission
… to this one God.
·
Like the prophets of
Israel, Muhammad linked his monotheism to a humanism, connecting faith in the
one God and his judgment to the demand for social justice.[52]
While Küng’s observations are profound, reading them could exacerbate a naïveté concerning the role of Muhammad’s life in Islam. In many ways, he was quite unlike and incongruent with the prophets of Israel. Truly, Muhammad most resembled Israel’s prophets during his preaching in Mecca, which was before the Hijra. Within Arabic, there are actually two words referring to a prophetic office, rasul and nabiy. Translators usually render rasul as prophet or messenger and nabiy as apostle. He was very much a Moses, a Joshua, and perhaps even a David to the primitive ummah. Unlike the prophets of Israel, the Qur’an portrays Muhammad as prophesied by Moses and Jesus as a specifically expected as a definite historical figure (Sura 61:6, 46:10).[53]
Christians are required to make a judgment, and this essay seeks to cause some to pursue a well-informed and candid judgment, which should be made conscientiously. Jesus Christ did warn his followers of false prophets to come, “For false christs and false prophets will rise and show great signs and wonders to deceive, if possible, even the elect. See I have told you beforehand. Therefore if they say to you, ‘Look, He is in the desert!’ do not go out” (Matthew 24.24-26a; NKJV). Nevertheless, we must remember that, “according to the New Testament there were also authentic prophets who came after Jesus: men and women who attested to him and his message, who interpreted and translated it for a new age and new situation.”[54] These New Testaments prophets were, however, of quite a different phenomenon than Muhammad’s experience and life—peculiar to the Body of Christ and distinct from Old Testament prophets.
Lastly, Muhammad’s life itself must be examined. Can Christians accept the conduct of his life? Scholars have criticized Muhammad often as being treacherous, cruel, licentious, and a fraud. Many controversial events occur in his life. He was far from a perfect man. The same is true for David, Moses, and Joshua as well. As is true for the biblical figures, Muhammad cannot be dismissed absolutely for glosses in his character. Nonetheless, to believe in Muhammad’s message, for Muslims, is to believe in the sunnah (i.e. deeds) of the Prophet holding it to be beyond reproach; whereas, believing in David, Moses, etc. does not entail believing in their being an impeccable example of a human being. Thus, there exists considerable difficulties when one desires to surrender one’s allegiance to the Prophet and his message.
Who was Jesus? Both faiths claim him as representing a messenger with a pure, undefiled version of God’s revelation. It astonishes one how much Islam and Christianity do agree upon about Jesus. In the Qur’an, Jesus, Isa ibn Maryam, is born of the Virgin Mary (Sura 3:45-47, 19:22-33), the Messiah or Christ (Sura 9:30), a righteous prophet (Sura 6:85), compared with Adam (Sura 3:59, cf. Romans 5), and even called God’s Word (Sura 3:45, 4:171). Such connections must be viewed suspiciously and with keen criticism. One cannot assume, just because the titles appear in both faiths, that the titles carry with them the same meaning. One should beware of making an artificial common ground—a religious astro-turf. Within the Qur’an, the meanings of these borrowed titles remain cryptic and ambiguous at best. Exactly what was the purpose of the Christ’s virgin birth? How, indeed, is Jesus the Messiah as is concerned to Israel? By saying that Jesus is God’s Word, does this point to a pre-natal, pre-virgin conception, and perhaps Divine existence? The Quran’s contents yield no answer, which vexes and perplexes the Christian reader. Our doctrines must never be read into the Qur’an, but the titles must be reinterpreted in light of other Quranic doctrines.
The Qur’an makes it very clear who Jesus is not, even if it leaves his true identity and mission vague. Quranic verses make lucidly clear that The Qur’an exists as a polemic against many Christian doctrines treasured for centuries before its advent:
Certainly they disbelieve who say: Surely Allah is
the third (person) of the three; and there is no god but God, and if they
desist not from what they say, a painful chastisement shall befall those among
them who disbelieve. Will they not then
turn to Allah and ask His forgiveness?
And Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.
(Sura 5:73,74; SHAKIR)
… The Christians say: The Messiah is the son of Allah; these are the words of their mouths; they imitate the saying of those who disbelieved before; may Allah destroy them; how they are turned away! (Sura 9:30; SHAKIR)
The Trinitarian doctrine and the Sonship of Jesus are both denied vehemently and totally. Beyond this, the redemptive Death and Resurection of Jesus of Nazareth is denied as efficacious unto salvation and even as historical events! Sura 7:157 reads,
And their saying: Surely we have killed the Messiah, Isa son of Maryam, the apostle of Allah; and they did not kill him nor did they crucify him, but it appeared to them so (like Isa) and most surely those who differ therein are only in a about it; they have no knowledge respecting it, but only follow a conjecture, and they killed him not for sure. (SHAKIR)
This is fatal to all chances of Christians and Muslims coming to an agreement on Jesus Christ. Tröger attempts to argue, in contradiction to an entire Islamic tradition while he is no Muslim by any means, that Muhammad himself, “in no way wanted to deny Jesus’ crucifixion and death as historical fact.”[55] He would like to suggest, instead, that Muhammad meant something moral—like it is impossible to kill the truth of Jesus’ message because it is so closely identified with Jesus. Muslim tradition explains the event with manifold substitution theories of innovative and creative variations. How can we be reconciled with a tradition that defies what Jesus says about himself and his closest disciples have disclosed concerning him? The most vexing and troublesome observation is that this defiance of Christianity nullifies those apparent similarities that we do share—in the sense that what appears to be shared belief is not truly shared belief.
How does God reveal Himself? In comparing the two faiths, many Muslims and Christian fall to the temptation of placing the Qur’an and Bible juxtapose to one another, as meant to be comparitevly weighed as if they both claim to be the same thing. Such action is a solecism. The Bible and Qur’an make quite different claims about themselves. In fact, the Bible itself makes no claim about itself per se. The Bible is not one work; it is many compiled into a collection. The Qur’an, however, is one work given by one person, Muhammad.
The Bible did not drop from heaven. It materialized through the thoughts of men who expressed the revelation given to them by the Holy Spirit with their limited human faculties, which were always culturally coniditioned. Christian Scripture is an intermingling of the human with the Divine. Nevertheless, we call it the Word of God,
The Bible is not simply God’s
Word: it is first of all and in its whole extent man’s word, the word of quite
definite individuals. The Bible does
not simply contain God’s Word: there are not certain parts that are not certain
propositions which are God’s Word, while the rest are man’s. The Bible becomes God’s Word: it becomes
God’s Word for anyone who submits trustfully and in faith to its testimony and
so to the God revealed in it and to Jesus Christ.[56]
Within the text, we read the humans who wrote the text claiming authorship and setting purposes of their own down as reasons for writing. Christians neither hide nor overlook this feature. We actually focus heavily upon it, recognizing that God uses humans to work within the world.
The Qur’an did drop from heaven according to Muslim belief. It is solely the Word of Allah related verbatim by the Holy Spirit (i.e. Gabriel, not the Third member of the Trinity, in the Qur’an) to Muhammad in parts to be memorized (Sura 17:106, 25:32, etc.). Furthermore, Muhammad was unlettered—ensuring the purity of the revelation (Sura 7:157, 62:2). In the Qur’an, God commands Muhammad to say of the revelation,
And when Our clear communications are recited to
them, those who hope not for Our meeting say: Bring a Qur’an other that this or
change it. Say: It does no beseem me that I should change it of myself; I
follow naught but what is revealed to me; surely I fear, if I disobey my Lord
the punishment of a mighty day. (Sura
10:15; SHAKIR)
Indeed, this exalted view even goes as far as to assert the eternal nature of the Qur’an itself. Speaking of its source, the Qur’an reads, “It is a transcript of the eternal book in Our keeping, sublime and full of wisdom” (Sura 43:4; DAWOOD).
In the end, the concept of the Qur’an is more related to the Logos of John 1:1-3; however, another discrepancy occurs when we learn that within Christianity the Word of God is a living persona—made flesh in Jesus of Nazareth (John 1:14). Within the Christian concept, we again see an intimate relationship existing between the revelation of God and humanity. It is awe-inspiring that God’s ultimate revelation of himself in Christian belief, Jesus Christ, is, indeed, both fully a real human and fully the real God.[57]
Is the Qur’an the word of God? For a Christian or Muslim to ask this is a precarious venture in and of itself. Wilfred Cantwell Smith writes,
In fact, the question, Is the Qur’an the word of
God? Insofar as it is a genuine
question, is a threat—both to Christian and to Muslim theology, simultaneously
for the same reason.
A Christian theologian who asks
it would be probably at least a heretic, if that category of thought were still
in use. A Muslim who asked it publicly
might quite possibly be killed.[58]
While I am unsure that asking the question makes me a heretic, I am aware of the danger involved. Smith suggests that the answer to the question is neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’ but, perhaps, both. He finds it to be true that those who approach the Qur’an as the word of God or as the word of man, namely Muhammad, to be scrutinized underneath historical-literary criticism both find their conclusions to be confirmed:
… both positions work. Each has found a pragmatic justification …
Those who hold the Qur’an to be the word of God, have found that this
conviction leads them to a knowledge of God.
Those who hold it to be the word of Muhammad, have found that this
conviction leads them to a knowledge of Muhammad. Each regards the other as blind.
[59]
The Qur’an claims to be the word of God in total. To believe otherwise would to assert that Muhammad had a part in creating it—or even his later followers—and that would mean he was deluded or a liar. It is obvious he denied this himself. I feel Christians are nonetheless required to recognize what Küng calls the Quran’s “transcendent religious character;”[60] however, we cannot affirm that it is the word of God—either divine or canonical. I wrestle with some final questions. Does not God speak to the hearts of men, even sometimes to Christians as we read its content, through the Qur’an? Though it may not be representative of God’s message, does it not sometimes mediate his revelation to man? By reading it can we not be convicted, challenged and even confronted by God’s Majesty and his claim upon our lives? So certainly it mediates revelation from God, so what differentiates it as not being a potential word from God?
Christian and Islamic uniqueness are affirmed, but we stand facing each other as different and separate. We cannot reconcile our two beliefs, and ultimately, one must be correct and the other wrong—or both may be wrong. The sadness involved, herein, is deep and heartbreaking. Why must we be cut off from those whom we have so much rapport with—are we not all children of Abraham? A believer finds it impossible to acknowledge the salvific efficacy of the Islamic message when it denies outright the means by which God has provided salvation for humanity. Can a Muslim receive salvation despite this error insofar as he submits to the one God seeking his guidance? Does God turn a deaf ear to a sincere Muslim who prays daily,
Thee do we serve and Thee do we beseech for help
Keep us on the right path.
The path of those upon whom Thou has bestowed favors.
Not (the path) of those upon who Thy wrath is brought down,
nor of those who go astray
Sura 1:5-7
The answer, as uncertain as it may be, solemnly echoes
throughout our history, but it also repudiates our history—hoping that by
creating understanding, we may never repeat the atrocities against each other
that we have before. Let us then seek
to exist in mutual respect—a respect that views each religion worthy of
listening to and worthy of inspecting diligently.
Bibliography
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Byrne, Peter. “John Hick’s Philosophy of World Religions.” Scottish Journal of Theology 35 (1982): 289-
301.
Cowdell, Scott. “Hans Küng and World Religions: The Emergence of a Pluralist.” Theology 92 (March
1989): 85-92.
Cragg, Kenneth. Muhammad and the Christian: A Question of Response. Maryknoll,NY: Orbis Books,
1984.
D’Costa, Gavin. “The Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions.” Religious Studies 32 (June 1996):
223-232.
Dashti, Ali. 23 Years: A Study of the Prophetic Career of Muhammad. Translated by F. R. C. Bagely.
Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1994.
Hick, John. A Christian Theology of Religions: the Rainbow of Faiths. Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 1995.
—. God and the Universe of Faiths. New York: Macmillan, 1973.
—. “The Possibility
of Religious Pluralism: A Reply to Gavin D’Costa.” Religious
Studies 33 (June 1997): 161-166.
Iqbal, Muhammad. The Reconstruciton of Religious Thought in Islam. Pakistan: Ashraf Printing Press,
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Doubleday, 1986.
—. On Being a Christian. Translated by Edward Quinn. New York: Image Books, 1968.
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“Religion for the Marketplace.” In Christian
Uniqueness Reconsidered: the Myth of a
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World Religions.” In Christian Uniqueness
Reconsidered: the Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of
Religions, ed. Gavin D’Costa, 16-29. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990.
Pinnock, Clark H.
“Towards an Evangelical Theology of Religions.” Journal of the Evangelical
Theological Society 33 (1990): 359-368.
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Darton, Longman, & Todd, 1966.
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. The Faith of Other Men. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.
—. On Understanding Islam. New York: Mouton Publishers, 1981.
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[1] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Faith of Other Men, (New
York: Harper & Row, 1963), 122-23.
He asserts, “The time will soon be with us when a theologian who
attempts to work out his position unaware that he does so as a member of a
world society in which other theologians equally intelligent, equally devout,
equally moral, are Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims …[will be] as out of date as is
one who attempts to construct an intellectual position unaware [of] … Aristotle
… existentialists … and that the earth is a minor planet in a galaxy that is
vast only by terrestrial standards.”
[2] Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans.
Edwyn C. Hoskyns (New York: Oxford, 1968), 35.
[3] Though the main theologians promoting an inclusivist
approach to the non-Christian religions examined in this paper are from the
Catholic tradition, even some Evangelicals have shown a desire to loosen the
austere, traditional exclusivist approach characterizing their tradition. For an example, see Clark H. Pinnock,
“Towards an Evangelical Theology of Religions,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 33 (1990): 359-368.
[4] Found in Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations Vol.
5: Later Writings, trans. Karl H. Kruger (London: Darton, Longman, &
Todd, 1966), 115-134.
[5] Ibid., 118.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] J. A. Veitch, “The Case for a Theology of Religions,” Scottish Journal of Theology 24 (1971): 412.
[9] Rahner, 119.
[10] Ibid., 121.
[11] Ibid., 122.
[12] Ibid., 124
[13] Ibid., 131
[14] Ibid., 132
[15] Ibid., 133.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Perhaps the most comprehensive and voluminous is Hans
Küng (with Josef van Ess, Heinrich von Stietencron & Heinz Bechert), Christianity and the World Religions, trans. Peter Heinegg (New York: Doubleday, 1986). Originally published in German in 1985, Küng
presents responses to his Orientalist colleagues’ presentations of major facets
of three world religions: Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. Though this work is an example of Küng’s
theological praxis, I am choosing to examine his views in On Being a Christian, trans. Edward Quinn (New York: Image Books,
1968); therein, he organizes and develops his methodology and understanding
concerning the world religions.
[18]See Küng, On Being a Christian, 89-116.
[19] Ibid., 91.
[20] Ibid., 92.
Küng does expound more upon these three ideas, but I have edited them to
include their most terse and succinct statements for the sake of space.
[21] Ibid., 97
[22] Ibid., 98
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid., 99
[25] Ibid., 104
[26] Ibid., 106-109
[27] Ibid., 110.
Scott Cowdell, “Hans Küng and World Religions: The Emergence of a
Pluralist,” Theology 92 (March 1989):
89, writes, “If Küng’s earlier notion of Christianity as a critical catalyst
remains, it is purely vestigial.” I
would disagree heartily with this notion in light of the fact that, in contrast
to Rahner’s theses, Küngs views have in mind mainly pragmatic methodology and
not abstract theologizing per se.
He is attached to reality more than Rahner in my opinion, though his
methodology is not flawless. His later
works fall in line with earlier views, and there is no distinctive conversion
to pluralism determinable in his works.
Admittingly, I have placed Küng in this paper because of the
fraternizing with pluralism that is evident throughout his works.
[28] Ibid., 111-112
[29] Ibid., 112
[30] Ibid., 115-116.
[31] Gavin D’Costa, “The Impossibility of a Pluralist View
of Religions,” Religious Studies 32 (June 1996): 225.
[32] John Hick, “The Possibility of Religious Pluralism: A
Reply to Gavin D’Costa,” Religious Studies 33 (June 1997): 161.
[33] Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Religious Pluralism and
Conflicting Truth Claims, “ in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered, ed.
Gavin D’Costa (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990), 100.
[34] Peter Byrne, “John Hick’s Philosophy of Word Religions,”
Scottish Journal of Theology 35 (1982): 290.
[35] Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths (New York:
Macmillan, 1973), 141.
[36] Ibid., 140.
[37] John Hick, A
Christian Theology of Religions: the Rainbow of Faiths (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press,
1995): 7-8.
[38] Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, 141.
[39] Byrne, 293
[40] Pannenberg, 100.
[41] Hick, A Christian Theology of Religions, 126.
[42] Leslie Newbigin, “Religion for the Marketplace,” in Christian
Uniqueness Reconsidered, ed. Gavin D’Costa (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books
1990): 142.
[43] Byrne, 301.
[44] Kenneth Cragg, Muhammad and the Christian: A
Question of Response (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984), 3.
[45] See Sura 7, 20 and Genesis 1-3.
[46] Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious
Thought in Islam (Pakistan: Ashraf Printing Press, 1986), 83.
[47] Ibid., 85
[48] Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
vol.1 (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 259.
[49] Iqbal, 81.
[50] Ali Dashti, 23 Years: A Study of the Prophetic
Career of Muhammad, trans. F. R. C. Bagely (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda
Publishers, 1994), 25.
[51] Muhammad faced the accusation of being mad or
demon-possessed quite often. For
examples, see Suras 7:184, 68:2, 69:40-43, and 81:22.
[52] Hans Küng, Christianity
and the World Religions, trans.
by Peter Heinegg (New York: Doubleday, 1986), 25-26.
[53] Traditionally, Muslims have referred to the
‘Comforter’ (Gk. Paraclete) of John 14 and the ‘Prophet like unto Moses’
of Deuteronomy 18 to be these specific prophecies mentioned in the Qur’an. Exegetical difficulties lie in the way of
Muslims seeking to make this assertion, however. Deuteronomy 18 specifies that the prophet will come from the
brothers of the Levites. Though
Montanis claimed to be the Paraclete of John 14 and even such an
articulate thinker as Tertullian believed this, Jesus’ description is specific
enough to clarify that the subject spoken about definitely transcends human
nature. Interpreting the Paraclete
as a late human personality within the Heilsgeschichte of the Father is
exegetically untenable.
[54] Ibid., 29; e.g. Ephesians 4.11 and 1
Corinthians 12.28.
[55] K.-W. Tröger, "Jesus, the Koran, and Nag
Hammadi,” Theology Digest 38
(1991): 218.
[56] Küng, On Being a Christian, 467.
[57] Because of space constraints, I have omitted a
discussion of the abrogation of Judaism and Christianity and their respective
Scripture by the Qur’an and Islam. To
treat this discussion properly, one would need to start almost an entire new
section. For a good discussion, see
Abdulaziz Sachedina, “Is Islamic Revelation an Abrogation of Judaeo-Christian
Revelation?” In Islam: A Challenge
for Christianity, eds. Hans Küng and Jürgen Moltmann (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books): 94-102.
[58] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, On Understanding Islam (New
York: Mouton Publishers, 1981), 290.
[59] Ibid., 292-293.
[60] Küng, Christianity and the World Religions, 32.